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Equitable Key Escrow with Limited Time Span(or, How to Enforce Time Expiration Cryptographically)Extended AbstractMike Burmester1, Yvo G. Desmedt2;1 and Jennifer Seberry31 Information Security Group, Royal Holloway { University of LondonEgham, Surrey TW20 OEX, U.K.m.burmester@rhbnc.ac.uk2 Center for Cryptography, Computer and Network SecurityDepartment of EE & CS, University of Wisconsin { MilwaukeeP.O. Box 784, WI 53201-0784, U.S.A.desmedt@cs.uwm.edu3 Center for Computer Security Research, University of Wollongong, Australia,jennie@uow.edu.auAbstract. With equitable key escrow the control of society over the in-dividual and the control of the individual over society are shared fairly.In particular, the control is limited to specied time periods. We con-sider two applications: time controlled key escrow and time controlledauctions with closed bids. In the rst the individual cannot be targetedoutside the period authorized by the court. In the second the individualcannot withhold his closed bid beyond the bidding period. We proposetwo protocols, one for each application. We do not require the use oftemper-proof devices.Key Words: key escrow, auctions with closed bids, time stamps.1 IntroductionKey escrow has been proposed as a mechanism to protect society from individu-als who use a communication system for criminal purposes [4, 24, 10] (an excel-lent survey of key escrow systems is given by D.E. Denning and D.K. Branstadin [11]). However key escrow can also be used to target innocent individuals. Thispotential targeting is a major factor which contributes to the social unaccept-ability of key escrow. >From the point of view of an individual, key escrow mayrestrict his/her privacy and give controlling power to society (Big Brother [8]),which may, in certain circumstances, abuse it. In a society oriented key escrowthis power must be equally shared between the individual and society (for ananalysis of fair cryptosystems see [24, 22]). Furthermore it must have a limitedlife span. Indeed a major objection to currently proposed key escrow schemesis that there is no eective time control. Once an order to recover a key bythe escrow agents has been given, there is nothing to prevent the agents from
abusing their power and decrypting all wire-tapped messages, far beyond thetime specied by the Court order. Various scenarios can be envisaged in whicha threat against a minority is indeed serious. While the Bellare{Goldwasser[3]scheme protects a majority against Big Brother, it does not protect a minority.For example, an extremist group aiming to take control of the government canwire-tap all communication of suspect dissidents, which would then be decryptedwhen the group took over control.It is essential that the control of the escrow agents be limited to speciedtime periods, beyond which it should not be possible for the agents to recoverthe \old" private keys of a targeted individual. For this purpose we have chosenin our rst application of equitable key escrow, to update the keys at regularintervals, and to make it infeasible to compute old keys from the new key. Theescrow agents must destroy all the shares of the old keys with each updating.We can allow for a small number of corrupted agents who keep their old shares,but these should not be sucient to reconstruct the keys.Our second application of equitable key escrow is contract bidding. In thiscase it is the individual who may try to abuse society. To prevent a tenderfrom being opened before the specied date, it is encrypted with an escrowedkey. The bidder must have some control over the encryption otherwise one canenvisage situations in which the escrow agents may collude with a corruptedreceiving agent. This threat can be eliminated if the bidder pre-encrypts the bidwith his/her own key. However the bidder may then withhold the key. Thereare several scenarios in which such a threat may be of concern. For example, ifaltered circumstances make the bid unprotable, or loss making. In this case,it is \society" (the receiving oce) which is threatened by the individual (thebidder). The solution we propose is to force the bidder to use a weak encryptionkey (a nice discussion on the use of weak keys is given in [28]). This imposes atime limit which should make it possible for the agents to recover the bid afterthe tender is opened. Two keys are used: a key for the bidder and an escrowedkey. The pair of these keys can be regarded as an enlarged escrow key, in whichthe share of the bidder is her/his key while the shares of the agents are their oldshares. In this way the bidder is included in all authorized sets.Our goal in this paper is to design protocols which achieve equitable keyescrow. For this purpose we combine the threshold scheme of Boyd [7], the El-Gamal threshold scheme of Desmedt{Frankel [14] and add time dependency. Theorganization of this paper has as follows. In Section 2 we present our rst proto-col for a time controlled key escrow system and discuss its security. In Section 3we present a protocol for time controlled auctions with closed bids.Notation and BackgroundLet p be a prime and g 2 Zp an element of large order. All operations in Zpare performed modulo p. For simplicity, and when there is no ambiguity, wedrop the operator \modp". We also write x 2R X to indicate that the element
x is selected uniformly at random from the set X, independently of all otherselections.The Die-Hellman [16] operator DH is dened by DH(gx; gy) = gxy. Theproblem of nding DH(gx; gy), given gx; gy, is believed to be hard, and is calledthe Die-Hellman problem. If gx; gy and z 2 Zp are given, then the problem ofdeciding whether z = DH(gx; gy) is called the Die-Hellman decision problem. Ifthis problem is hard then so is the Die-Hellman problem. The symmetric Die-Hellman problem (called the squaring DH-oracle in [23]) is the problem of ndingDH(gx; gx) given gx. This problem is as hard as the Die-Hellman problem undersome reasonable conditions [23, Theorem 2]. The problem of deciding whetherz = DH(gx; gx), given z; gx is the symmetric Die-Hellman decision problem. Ifthis problem is hard then so are the Die-Hellman problem, the Die-Hellmandecision problem and the symmetric Die-Hellman decision problem. We willalso consider the problem of nding elements with large order in Zp. This isrelated to Problem C19 in the Adleman{McCurley list of open problems inNumber Theoretic Complexity [1], and is considered to be hard.2 Time controlled key escrowFor simplicity we focus on a basic `-out-of-` escrow system. We will discussgeneralizations to other access structures later on.Our system uses a Discrete Logarithm setting with prime modulus p andg 2 Zp an appropriate element of large order. Initially, at time t = 0, the privatekey of the receiver, Bob, is a 2R Zp 1 and the public key is y0 = gamod p. Bobshares his private key among ` escrow agents EAi, i = 1; 2; : : : ; `.In our basic model each agent gets a share si 2R Zp 1 (i = 1; 2; : : : ; `   1),and s` is such that s1 s2   s` = a mod (p  1). The main feature of our systemis that the private key of Bob and its shares are updated at regular intervalswithout the need for interaction. At time t, the private key of Bob is updatedto a2tmod (p   1), the shares are updated to si2tmod (p   1), and the publickey is updated to yt = ga2tmod p. The agents EAi compute the new shares bythemselves, andmust destroy the old shares. As a consequence, the escrow agentscannot decrypt a ciphertext which was encrypted with an old key at a later date,even if forced. We shall prove that the problem of decrypting encryptions withearlier keys is related to two problems: the problem of nding elements of largeorder in Zp and the symmetric Die-Hellman decision problem. Both problemsare believed to be hard (cf. [1, 23]).We rst describe our basic protocol in more detail. This combines ideasfrom [6, 7, 14, 26].SettingThe parties involved: the sender Alice, the receiver Bob, a Court, the LawEnforcement Agency LEA, and the Escrow Agents EAi, i = 1; 2; : : :; `.The parameters: A Discrete Logarithm setting is used. Bob chooses a prime psuch that p  1 has two large prime factors p1; p2, with p1  p2  3 (mod 4), so
( 1 j p1) = ( 1 j p2) =  1 (p1p2 is a Blum integer [6]), and an element g 2 Zpwhose order is p1p2. Bob gives p; g to all the agents EAi, i = 1; 2; : : : ; `, and toAlice.Bob has a long term public key which is known to all parties concerned. This keyis used for authenticating (signing) Bob's encryption keys and the parametersp; g, if required.Set-upSet time := 0.Bob chooses his private key a 2R Zp 1 and nds ` shares si of it, i = 1; : : : ; `, bychoosing si 2R Zp 1 for i = 1; : : : ; ` 1, and taking s` = a(s1    s` 1) 1mod(p  1).The public key of Bob is y0 = ga. Bob publishes this key.Then,1. Bob gives privately to each agent EAi, i = 1; 2; : : : ; `, the share si.2. Bob publishes z1 := gs1 ; z2 := gs2 ; : : : ; z` := gs` , and each agent EAi checksthat these are correct, that is that zi = gsi , where si is its share. If any checkfails then Bob has cheated and is reported to the LEA.Bob publishes z1;2 := gs1s2 ; z1;2;3 := gs1s2s3 ; : : : ; z1;2;;` := gs1s2s` (= y0),and proves in zero-knowledge to the LEA that these are correctly con-structed. That is, Bob proves that z1;2;:::;k = DH(z1;2;:::;k 1; zk), for k =2; : : : ; `, by using an interactive zero-knowledge proof for the Die-Hellmanproblem { an example of such a proof is given in Appendix A. If any of theproofs fails, then Bob has cheated and is reported to the LEA.The protocolUpdatingAt time = tEach agent EAi updates his share by squaring it, i.e., the current share issi2tmod (p  1), and then destroys the old share (si2t 1mod (p  1)).Bob updates his private key to a2tmod (p   1) and publishes his public keyyt := ga2tmod p. If necessary Bob proves to the LEA that this is correct byusing an interactive zero-knowledge proof for the Die-Hellman problem (forexample, the interactive proof given in Appendix A). That is, Bob proves thatyt = DH(yt 1; yt 1).Getting an escrowed key1. Alice asks Bob for a new encryption key.2. Bob sends Alice his public key which is authenticated with his long termkey, (p; g; yt; signBob(p; g; yt)).3. If Bob's signature is valid then Alice sends Bob the encryption ElG(m) =(gr ;mytr), r 2R Zp 1, of a message m 2 Zp with key yt.
4. If the Court has issued an order to recover the message, then the LEAwill wire-tap the communication and send gr to agent EA1. The agentsEA1;EA2; : : : ;EA` then compute ytr sequentially as follows: for i < `, eachEAi on receiving grQi 1j=1 s2tj computes grQij=1 s2tj := (grQi 1j=1 s2tj )s2ti , which itsends to EAi+1. Agent EA` then computes (grQ` 1j=1 s2tj )s2t` , which it sends tothe LEA. Since this corresponds to ytr, the LEA can decrypt the ciphertext.SecurityTheorem1. (Irreversible time) If the symmetric Die-Hellman decisionproblem is hard and if nding elements of large order in Zp is hard, then de-crypting old ciphertext with new shares of the escrow agents is hard.Proof. (Sketch) At time t   1 the shares of the escrow agents are s2t 1i andthe secret key of Bob is a2t 1 . At time t the shares are updated to s2ti , the oldshares are destroyed, and Bob's secret key is updated to a2t . Observe that a2t,for t > 1, has 4 square roots in Zp1p2 of which only one is a quadratic residue,because of our restrictions on the primes p1; p2. It follows that there is only oneprimitive 2u{th root of a2t in Zp1p2 , 0 < u  t, which is a quadratic residue.We continue with the proof. Suppose that there is a polynomial time algo-rithm A which on input p; g; z1; z2; : : : ; z`, z1;2, z1;2;3, . . . , z1;2;:::;`, the sharess2t1 ; s2t2 ; : : : ; s2t` , the old shares of (` 1) corrupted shareholders, Bob's long termkey, the certicates (p; g; yi; signBob(p; g; yi)), i = 1; 2; : : : ; `, and an old cipher-text (w1; w2), with w1 = gr, r 2 Zp 1, w2 = myrt u, m 2 Zp , will output themessage m. Then A can be used to compute gra2t u (= w2=m), since any of theother 2u{th roots of a2t u will not produce the correct message. We now will useA to get an element in Zp of large order. First we prepare an input for A.Find an appropriate long term key for Bob. Take b 2R Zp 1 and chooses1; s2; : : : ; s` 1 2R Zp 1. Compute s := s1  s2    s` 1, s` := b  (s) 1, and thepublic keys yt u = gb, yt u+1 = gb2, . . . , yt = gb2u. If t = u, we get ` shares si ofb and the public keys y0 = gb, y1 = gb2 , . . . , yt = gb2t . If t > u, take b0 2R Zp 1and choose 1; 2; : : : ; ` 1 2R Zp 1. Compute  := 1  2    ` 1, z1 := g1 ,z2 := g2 , . . . , z` 1 := g` 1 , z` := gb0=, z1;2 := g12 , . . . , z1;2;:::;` := gb0 ,and y0 := gb0 , y1 := gb20 ,. . . , yt u 1 := gb2t u 10 . Observe that even though it ishighly unlikely that the public key yt u is properly constructed when t > u (thatis, it is highly unlikely that yt u = DH(yt u 1; yt u 1), or that g2ti = gs2u` ), itis hard for A to recognize this, if the symmetric Die-Hellman decision problemis hard.Give as input toA: p; g; z1; z2; : : : ; z`, z1;2; : : : ; z1;2;:::;`, the shares s1; : : : ; s` 1,the public keys y0 = gb, y1 = gb2, . . . , yt = gb2u, Bob's long term key, togetherwith the certicates (p; g; yi; signBob0(p; g; yi)), i = 1; 2; : : :; `, and an \old" ci-phertext ( w1; w2) encrypted at time t   u, with w1 = gr , r 2R Zp 1, and
w2 2R Zp . Algorithm A will output a message m such that z2= m = grd, whered is a 2u{th root of b2u which is a quadratic residue in Zp1p2 . However b waschosen at random in Zp 1, so that with probability 3/4 we get that b mod p1p2is not a residue in Zp1p2 . Then with probability one half, b d is either a multipleof p1 or a multiple of p2. This means that grd=grb = gr(d b) has order p1 or p2.Consequently A can nd an element in Zp of large order.Theorem2. (Privacy) A wire-tapper may try to decipher the ciphertext. Thisis as hard as the Die-Hellman problem.Proof. (Sketch) We show this by using the approach in [13]. Suppose that B isa polynomial time algorithm which on input: p; g; z1; z2; : : : ; z`, z1;2, z1;2;3, . . . ,z1;2;:::;`, the certicates (p; g; yi; signBob0(p; g; yi)), i = 1; 2; : : : ; `, and the cipher-text ( w1; w2), w1 = gr, w2 = mytr, will output m. Let p; g; yt; w1 be an instanceof the the Die-Hellman problem. Construct z1; z2; : : : ; z`, z1;2; ; : : : ; z1;2;:::̀ ,y0; y1; : : : ; yt 2 Zp , as in the previous case. Give this as input to B togetherwith ( w1; w2), to get a \message" m such that w2= m = DH(yt; w1) (= yrt ).The rest can all be simulated because we have used zero-knowledge proofs.2.1 GeneralizationsGeneralizing time controlled l-out-of-l key escrow systems to l0-out-of-l systems,is straightforward when using more complex secret sharing schemes over Zp 1().Secret sharing schemes that could be used for this purpose can be found in [15,12, 2, 5], when using techniques such as those described in [17, 13]. Robustnesscan be achieved by using, for example [20, 19].Other properties such as proactive secret sharing can also be achieved us-ing [21, 18, 27].3 Time controlled auctions with closed bidsWe rst consider a basic (additive) `-out-of-` escrow system, using a simplesetting. Generalizations will be discussed later.Our system uses a Discrete Logarithm setting with composite modulus n =p1p2, where p1; p2 are appropriate large primes. The bidder, Alice, chooses n andg1; g2 2 Zn such that g1 has large order whereas g2 has a rather small prime orderq. Alice has two public keys for encryption: y1 = ga11 mod n, y2 = ga22 mod n,where a1 2R Z(n), a2 2R Zq . The private key a1 is shared among ` escrowagents EAi, i = 1; 2; : : : ; `. The other is not shared. For this system the publickey y2 is weak and must be used only once. This key must be such that it canbe recovered by an exhaustive search of the key space, but the time taken forthis search should not be too short.44 Since an exhaustive search is parallelizable, some kind of inherently sequential schememay be used, such as the time-lock puzzles proposed in [28]. Our protocol can easilybe adapted to allow for such schemes.
Alice \double" encrypts her contract bid m by using the keys y1; y2. LetElG2(m) be the encryption. Alice sends this to the receiving agent Bob. Atcompletion she will reveal both secret keys a1; a2, from which Bob will get thetendered bidm. If Alice refuses to reveal these keys, then Bob informs the escrowagents who will enable a rst decryption. This will make it possible for Bob toget an encryption ElG(m) of m with private key a2. Bob then initiates a pro-cedure to recover m, by exhaustively breaking this encryption. Bob can achievethis because the second key is relatively weak. A similar argument applies if aCourt order is issued to the escrow agents to enable the decryption of ElG2(m).The security issues of this protocol will be discussed in more detail later. Werst describe the protocol more formally.SettingThe parties involved: the bidder Alice, the receiving ocer Bob, a Court, theLaw Enforcement Agency LEA, and the Escrow Agents EAi, i = 1; 2; : : : ; `.The parameters: Both Alice and Bob have long term public keys which areknown to each other. These keys are used for authentication (signing).A Discrete Logarithm setting is used with a composite modulus n. Alice choosesn = p1p2, a product of two large primes p1; p2, with p1 1 = 2qq1, p2 1 = 2qq2,q1; q2 primes, and q a rather small prime (say 140 bits).Alice chooses g1 2R Zn and g2 2 Zn such that ord(g2 mod p1) = ord(g2 modp2) = q. Here ord(g2 mod p1) is the order of g2 in Zp1 and ord(g2 mod p2) is theorder of g2 in Zp2 . Consequently g2 has order q in Zn.Set-upAlice chooses a1 2R Z(n) and a2 2R Zq. The public key of Alice is (n; q; g1; g2; y1; y2),where y1 := g1a1mod n, y2 := g2a2mod n.Alice nds ` shares of a1, by choosing exponents si 2R Z(n) for i = 1; 2; : : :; ` 1,and taking s` = a1   (s1 + s2 + : : :+ s` 1) mod(n).1. Alice gives privately to each agent EAi, i = 1; 2; : : : ; `, the share si.2. Alice publishes z1 := gs1 ; z2 := gs2 ; : : : ; z` := gs` . Each agent EAi checksthat zi = gsi and reports failure to the LEA. The LEA checks that ga =z1 z2    z`. If any of the checks of the EAi's fails or if the LEA's check failsthen Alice has cheated, the tender is rejected, and appropriate actions aretaken.Sending an encrypted contract bid1. Alice sends Bob the pair of her public keys authenticated with her long termkey, (n; q; g1; g2; y1; y2; signAlice(g1; g2; n; q; y1; y2));and the encrypted bid ElG2(m) = (gr11 ; gr22 ;myr11 yr22 ); where m 2 Zn is thebid and r1; r2 2R Zn.
2. If the parameters are in the appropriate elds, with q a small prime, if theorder of g2 is q, and if Alice's public keys are authenticated properly, thenBob accepts the tender and sends Alice a receipt signBob(Alice;ElG2(m)).Opening a tenderWhen the tender is due to be opened, Alice sends Bob the private keys a1; a2.Bob checks these for correctness. If correct, ElG2(m) is decrypted to get the bidm, which is validated.If Alice refuses to send her keys, the LEA is informed and initiates a procedureto recover m.The Court recovers the bidIf the Court has issued an order to recover the bid, the LEA will wire-tap thecommunication and send gr1 to the escrow agents who will compute yr11 . Fromthis the LEA can get ElG(m) = (g2r2 ;my2r2 ):The key for this ciphertext is weak,so the LEA can recover m by brutal force. However, q has to be suciently largeto prevent a conspiracy, as explained further on.SecurityThe security of this system relies on the diculty of factoring a number n = p1p2,p1; p2 primes, when a particular number g 2 Zn is given, with a rather smallprime order q. It is important that both g mod p1 6= 1 and g mod p2 6= 1. Oth-erwise, if say g mod p1 = 1, then p1 is a factor of g   1 and it becomes easy tofactor n by taking the gcd(n; g   1). Observe that for g = n   1 we have q = 2,but this trivial case is too small to be of any use for us.Fair auction biddingAlice may refuse to open her bid, on completion. Bob will inform the LEA andthe Court will authorize the escrow agents to decrypt the ciphertext. The escrowagents will compute yr11 from which the LEA will get ElG(m) = (g2r2 ;my2r2 ):The key for this ciphertext is weak, so the LEA can initiate a procedure to re-cover m by brutal force. (Note that q has to be suciently large, as we nowexplain.)ConspiracyThe agents may be corrupted by the bidding ocer Bob. They will recoverElG(m) = (g2r2 ;my2r2 ); but if the key y2 is not too weak they will not be ableto recover the message in time. For this reason q cannot be too small.Theorem3. (Privacy) A wire-tapper may try to decipher the bid m. This isas hard as breaking the Die-Hellman problem.Proof. (Sketch) Suppose that A is a polynomial time algorithmwhich on input:n; q; g1; g2; y1; y2, authenticated with Alice's long term key, z1; z2; : : : ; z`, and
(gr11 ; gr22 ;my1r1y2r2), will outputm. Let n; g1; y1; g1r1 be an instance of the Die-Hellman problem as in [13]. Take s1; : : : ; s` 1 2R Zn, and s = s1 + : : :+ s` 1.Then let z1 = gs1 , . . . , z` 1 = gs` 1 and z` = y1g s1 . Find an appropriate longterm key for Alice. Finally take r2 2R Zq and compute g2r2 and y2r2 .Give as input to A: n; q; g1; g2; y1; y2, authenticated with Alice's public key,z1; : : : ; z`, and (gr11 ; gr22 ; w), where w 2R Zn. Algorithm A will output m, suchthat w= m = yr11 yr22 , from which we get DH(y1; g1r1) = yr11 .GeneralizationsSimilar generalizations to those in Section 2.1 apply. (Although 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 = gamod p,  = gbmod p,  =gabmod p.Repeat independently t = log p times the following subroutine:1. The Prover selects exponents x; y 2R Zp 1 and sends to the Verier: x=gx mod p, y = gy mod p, xy = gxy mod p, ay = gay mod p, and bx =gbx mod p.2. The Veri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x mod p.If e = 1 the Prover sends a0 = a + x mod (p   1), b0 = b + y mod (p   1) tothe Verier who checks that: ga0    x (modp), gb0    y (modp), andga0b0    ay  bx  xy (modp).If any of the checks fails, the Verier halts and rejects the proof.The Verier accepts the proof of the Prover if all t rounds have been completedsuccessfully.Let L = f(p; ; ; ) j p prime; = gamod p;  = gbmod p;  = gabmod pg:Then,Theorem4. The protocol above is a perfect zero-knowledge proof of membershipin L.Proof. (Sketch)Completeness: Obvious.Soundness: If the Prover can answer the queries e = 0; 1 then there exist a; b; x; y
such that a0 = a+ x mod (p  1), b0 = b+ y mod (p  1), with ay = y mod p,bx = x mod p, xy = gxy mod p, and   ga0b0   1ay   1bx   1xy  gab (modp).Zero-knowledge: Let ; ;  be given. Pick a0; b0 2R Zp 1, and let x = ga0= mod p,y = gb0= mod p. Then solve b0    ay (modp), a0    bx (modp),ga0b0    ay  bx  xy (modp), for the unknowns ay; bx, xy, respectively.
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